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Africa’s industrial performance has been poor and its ability to industrialize successfully is 
under increasing question. This paper argues that industrialization remains vital to African 
development. It  describes the current global industrial setting and  analyses the recent 
performance of African manufacturing relative to that of other developing regions. It finds 
that Africa  is  becoming i ncreasingly marginal to the  technological  dynamics of global 
economy. It shows few signs of a responding to the competitive stimulus of liberalization or 
of attracting more mobile  foreign productive  factors.  It  analyses the reasons for this 
performance and argues that the basic problem of African industry lies not in the investment 
climate (which can certainly be improved) or in gaining market access to rich countries 
(which is already very good for manufactures, and has improved with initiatives like AGOA) 
but in the low level of its  industrial capabilities. The paper concludes with the need to 
reconsider current African  industrial strategy and to evolve a new strategy focused on 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The economic travails of  Sub-Saharan Africa continue to receive  intense public attention. 
This paper  focuses on  its experience in  the manufacturing sector. Manufacturing  remains 
essential to African growth; with rapid technical change and globalization, it is becoming 
more important as the main engine for modernizing and diversifying the region’s economic 
base. Today, however, manufacturing can only fulfil this role if it is competitive (not just in 
export markets but, with liberalization, also at home).  This paper  treats two aspects of 
industrialization that experience shows to be vital: the ability to master new technologies by 
mounting technological effort and to access new technologies by  attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI), particularly in export-oriented activity.  
National competitiveness  has  many  needs. Perhaps the most fundamental is a good 
investment climate: a stable social and political regime, sound macro management and legal 
framework, low business costs, a reasonable skill base and adequate infrastructure. However, 
industrial success requires more than  a good investment climate – it needs the ability to 
respond vigorously in an increasingly competitive and technology-oriented environment. This 
ability does not arise automatically. It  is based on cumulative effort to build a range of 
technological, managerial and institutional capabilities: just opening up to global markets, 
technology and capital flows, without a base of capabilities, means that economies cannot 
competitively handle new industrial technologies. If they cannot, they risk marginalisation in 
a globally integrated market.  
The development of capabilities  faces market and  institutional  failures. Overcoming such 
failures requires  strategy, to tap foreign sources of knowledge, technology and skills, to 
absorb these locally and to build a base that can attract foreign resources. The countries that 
have developed the strongest capabilities in recent times, the East Asian Tigers, adopted a 
variety of strategies to overcome those failures (Lall, 1996, 2001, Lall and Urata, 2003). 
Africa has not adopted any of these different strategies successfully.  
As a result, industrial capabilities are weak in Africa and its performance, particularly since 
liberalization, has been  very  disappointing. Africa’s share of global manufacturing value 
added has fallen from a tiny 1 percent in 1980 to 0.8 percent by 2000 (excluding South Africa, 
these figures are 0.43 and 0.41 percent). Its share of world manufactured exports has gone 
from 0.7 to 0.6 percent over this period (0.3 and 0.2 percent without South Africa). It  is 
practically ‘off the map’ in the most dynamic and  technologically  rewarding areas of 
manufacturing. Not only is Africa becoming marginal to the dynamics of the global economy, 
it shows little signs of a technological response to the new challenges. This is despite the fact 
that export markets are now more open (Africa has the best access to world markets for 
manufactures) and global resource (knowledge, capital, technology and skills) more mobile.  
This persistent failure of African manufacturing to grow and compete is  more than an 
economic loss – it is perverting future economic strategy because analysts are becoming very 
pessimistic about African industrial prospects. The pessimism is growing as the demands of 
competitive industrialization rise and other low wage regions and higher capabilities enter the 
arena. It is not uncommon to come across a belief, often left implicit, that ‘Africa cannot 
industrialize’.  
This pessimism is unwarranted, and its consequences are dangerous. Overcoming it, however, 
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in capabilities  and governance  be tackled directly rather than left to the mercies of 
liberalization and globalization. Africa’s capability problems are not unique, of course; other 
developing regions have faced them, and some have overcome them with dramatic success. It 
is possible for Africa to do the same, entering into competitive manufacturing by 
strengthening local capabilities and attracting mobile capabilities from overseas. There are 
hopeful signs of a start in clothing and textile exports in some countries, stimulated by trade 
preferences offered by the US. Exports of processed natural resources are also growing. The 
investment climate in many countries in the region has improved greatly. These signs of 
industrial revival need to be nurtured and strengthened, and the structure of activity 
reoriented to take advantage of the dynamics of global industrial growth.  
This will need a concerted effort by the countries themselves and by the international and 
donor community. In this paper, we review what the effort to build and attract competitive 
capabilities may comprise. Our focus is not competitiveness as a whole, but technological 
effort and FDI in particular; and our aim is to draw useful lessons from East Asia.  
This paper starts with brief sections on the significance of industrialization to Africa (section 
2), the current global setting (section 3) and the need for local technological activity (section 
4). It then reviews African industrial performance, focusing on its competitive performance in 
different technological segments as compared to other regions (sections 5 and 6). It then 
considers its technological and skill base – the two are intimately correlated – and its FDI 
performance (sections 7 and 8). Section 9 draws the conclusions.  
2. WHY INDUSTRIALIZATION IS IMPORTANT FOR AFRICA  
Sustained economic development entails structural transformation. It involves a shift from 
traditional low-productivity, primary activities and low-value services to activities that use 
modern technologies, create new skills, generate exports and employment, and have 
beneficial spillover effects on other activities and institutions. Manufacturing has been, and 
remains, the main engine of structural transformation. While its contribution to GDP in most 
countries reaches a peak at 30-40 percent and then declines as modern services grow, its 
contribution to development is much more significant (Box 1). It is this contribution that 
Africa has failed to tap.  
Manufacturing is critical to changing and modernizing Africa’s economic structure. It is the 
main  avenue  for applying new technologies to production and for raising  technical and 
managerial capabilities. It is crucial to raising and diversifying exports, moving  the region 
from  its continued dependence  low value-added  and unstable primary  products.  It  is 
necessary to create new skills, work attitudes and institutions. And it can be the driver of 
growth and productivity  in other activities: agriculture, information-based services, finance, 
construction, logistics and so on. The catalytic role of manufacturing is as relevant today to 
Africa as it has been to other regions in the past.  
There has been much hyperbole about the information economy as means of leapfrogging to 
the economic frontier without going through the industrialization stage – so far this remains 
in the realms of hyperbole. Most of the relocation of IT-based services is going to developing 
countries with large industrial sectors and the only activities that may go to less industrialized 
countries are likely to be call centres: it is not clear that this will provide sufficient impetus to 
drive African  growth. In our view, industrialization remains the main avenue for sustained 
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Box 1: The importance of manufacturing industry  
(1) Manufacturing industry is the main vehicle for the  application of technological progress to production. While 
agriculture also enjoys technical progress, the pace of technical change has historically been low – much lower than in 
manufacturing. Agriculture is constrained by the presence of one fixed factor, land, while manufacturing can apply a 
limitless variety of inputs and equipment. Moreover, many industrial technologies involve increasing returns to scale, 
enormous potential for further learning and for incremental improvement. Thus, the shift from low- to high-productivity 
activities has always involved a shift from agriculture and traditional services to industry. In recent years, modern 
information- and communication-based services have also attracted innovative activity; however, this has been possible only 
because of technological advances in the hardware of information processing and telecommunications.  
(2) Manufacturing is itself the major  source of innovation. Research and development (R&D) by private industrial 
enterprises has grown in importance since the nineteenth century, and now accounts for the bulk of innovation in advanced 
countries (industrial enterprises also finance significant R&D in other laboratories and universities). Moreover, formal R&D 
is only part of the technology development process. A significant part takes place in the engineering, production, 
procurement, quality management and other departments of enterprises. The scope for such innovation is enormous in 
manufacturing, perhaps more so than in other activities.  
(3) Manufacturing is the hub for diffusing innovation to other activities, providing capital goods and transmitting new 
technical and organisational knowledge. Historically, the capital goods sector has been such a hub; today the electronics 
industry is at the centre of technical diffusion. In particular, the use of information technology related equipment by all 
activities involves considerable spread of new technology, accompanied by close interaction between suppliers and users.  
(4) Manufacturing is a vital source of new skills and attitudes, particularly in transforming traditional economic structures. 
There are several elements to this contribution: 
•  The creation of an industrial work ethic, with the spreading of discipline and organisation required in modern societies;  
•  The fostering of entrepreneurial capabilities, with small enterprises providing the seedbed;  
•  The development of new managerial and technological capabilities, the core of modernisation and competitiveness.  
•  The creation of skills by enterprises. Enterprises invest increasingly in enhancing employee skills, by in-house and 
external training. In countries like Japan, investments in enterprise training are larger than spending by the higher-education 
sector; 
•  The interaction between industrial enterprises and educational institutions. As skill needs change more rapidly, and 
become more specialised, there is closer interaction between the users and providers of formal education, creating beneficial 
synergies for the economy; 
•  Larger inflows of foreign skills, a growing feature of globalised production (also very important in modern services). 
Manufacturing enterprises with international operations move highly skilled manpower around the globe as needed, filling 
gaps and providing beneficial training and spillover effects.  
(5) Manufacturing led the development of modern institutions and legal structures (like joint stock companies, accounting 
standards, and corporate governance norms) that the modern economy requires.  
(6) Innovation and skill creation by manufacturing have large beneficial externalities for other activities: agriculture gains 
by having better equipment and inputs, improved storage, transport, distribution and processing facilities and richer 
consumers. Services gain from better equipment and skills.  
(7) Manufacturing also provides the direct demand stimulus for the growth of many modern services. It is often the largest 
customer for banking, transport, insurance, communications, advertising, utilities and other activities. It creates markets for 
new services and skills, particularly important for finance, education and logistics. It is also directly the source of new 
service enterprises: many services were originally part of manufacturing firms and were hived off to provide design, logistics, 
maintenance, training and other services.  
(8) Manufacturing is the main source of dynamic comparative advantage, the shift from primary to more advanced (and 
generally more dynamic and high value) manufactured exports. Manufacturing now accounts for around 90 per cent of 
global visible trade and its share has grown steadily over time. Terms of trade for manufactures have also improved steadily 
over time. While modern service exports are also growing, much of this growth comes from relatively advanced countries 
that have built modern skills and capabilities by manufacturing. It is difficult to find countries selling high-value services 
(excluding tourism) that have not first undergone industrial development: the institutions and skills now involved in service 
exports were developed in conjunction with manufacturing.  
(9) The internationalization of the economy often follows the spread of manufacturing TNCs. Banks, transport-providers, QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 5  
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advertisers and so on are setting up across the world to serve customers with whom they have relations. The current phase of 
globalisation, with integrated production and other facilities across countries, has been led by manufacturing firms (resource-
extraction TNCs never ‘globalised’ in terms of integrating operations at all levels across countries).  
(10) The exposure to foreign markets, enterprises, skills and practices that manufacturing brings can be the catalyst for 
modernization of national industrial enterprises, as seen in East Asia. Such modernisation would not have been possible 
without industrial development.  
In sum, industry has been the main source, user and diffuser of technical progress and associated skills and attitudes. No 
other productive activity comes near it. Its special role can only be understood in a world of dynamic learning and technical 
change, where large firms strive to increase their size and capabilities and realise economies of scale, and societies 
constantly transform their structures and habits. In this world, manufacturing industry is not only important for development 
– it is the essential ingredient.  
3. THE CHANGING SETTING FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION  
Industrialization today requires 
competitiveness. This simple 
statement has many implications. 
Industrial enterprises have always 
competed with each other, but 
competition in the past was confined 
mainly to local or national markets. 
There were two reasons for this. One 
was technological: high transport 
costs, lack of information on foreign 
markets and difficulties in 
communicating over long distances 
or across national boundaries. The 
other was policy-induced: 
governments in most developing 
countries (and developed countries in 
their early days of industrialization) restricted international competition by tariffs, quotas, 
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Figure 2: Cost of a 3 minute telephone call from London to New York (in 1990 $)  
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Both barriers are falling rapidly. New technologies are shrinking economic distance 
dramatically (Figure 1); the falling costs of communication, in particular, are leading to the 
‘death of distance’ in information transmission (Figure 2).  The shrinking of economic 
distance opens up new opportunities for competitive activity for developing countries, but it 
also threatens them with new competition. In Africa, the real competitive threat does not 
come so much from industrialized countries as from other low wage economies with stronger 
industrial bases: these countries may establish strong first mover advantages in the industries 
that Africa may compete in and so stifle its entry and growth. 
The setting for industrialization today is also changing in other ways. Rapid, pervasive and 
continuous technical progress in manufacturing technologies is raising the threshold level of 
skills and capabilities needed for competitive production. This is true of all activities, from 
the simplest labour-intensive ones like apparel and textiles and resource-based ones like food 
or mineral processing – obvious entry points for African countries – to the most sophisticated 
technology-based ones like electronics, pharmaceuticals or advance equipment. The days in 
which developing countries could enter global value chains (say, for electronics) and launch 
export-oriented industrialization on the basis of semi-skilled cheap labour alone are gone: 
Africa has to provide much more advanced capabilities to get in on the first rung, and 
upgrade them rapidly to match the advantages provided by earlier entrants. 
Technical progress is changing the way in which trade and production are organized. 
Enterprises are increasingly searching for low cost sites, moving resources like capital, 
technology and skills to places that can provide the right complementary factors. Many such 
moves are under the aegis of multinational companies (MNCs). Around two-thirds of world 
trade is now handled by MNCs and of this about one-third, the most dynamic segment, is 
within the companies and not on open markets. Export success depends increasingly on 
entering these fast-growing internal production systems. Shrinking economic distance makes 
it feasible  for MNCs to relocate processes and functions in far-flung sites. The resulting 
‘fragmentation’ of production has led to new forms of competitive advantage, based on a 
narrower range of assets. Tapping fragmentation can rapidly transform the production and 
export structure of developing countries (Lall, Albaladejo and Zhang, 2004).  
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As important for competitiveness as new production technologies and trade organization is 
structural change in trade. Put simply, innovative products (with high R&D spending) are 
growing faster than those with slow-changing technologies ( Figure 3). High  technology 
products have raised their share of trade from the lowest to the second highest – they are now 
the main engines of growth in world trade. Primary  and resource-based products have lost 
ground and low technology products have stagnated since the mid-1990s. Good ‘positioning’ 
requires countries move into more innovative products; the Asian Tigers,
2 including China, 
have  done just this;  their recent export growth comes  largely  from technology-intensive 
products. However, only a few have built domestic capabilities in such advanced industrial 
products – most have simply ‘plugged into’ the global production networks of MNCs.  
In an innovation-driven world, there are other reasons (apart from rapid export growth) to 
favour a structural shift to technology-based activities. HT products grow more rapidly than 
incomes (they are highly income elastic), they cut costs more rapidly and they offer greater 
benefits in terms of skill and capability creation, spillovers to other activities and flexibility in 
responding to changing conditions. Even plugging into the low end of HT activity, say by 
assembling electronics, allows quicker moves up the technology ladder as costs rise (in 
Malaysia, higher wages led electronics MNCs to deepen local technology and grow while 
clothing stagnated and moved offshore). By doing so, they allow countries to combine rising 
wages with production and export growth – no economy can develop by staying in low-value 
processes and simple products. 
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Structural changes in trade  to some extent reflect  similar changes in production.
3 The 
production of technology-intensive products  is growing  much faster that that of other 
manufactures (Figure 4). According to data from the US National Science Board (2002) on 
the 68 countries accounting for over 95% of global economic activity, hi-tech production 
grew at 6.0% per annum over 1980-98, over twice as rapidly as other products (2.7%). More 
interestingly, hi-tech production also grew more rapidly in all developing countries, with the 
                                                 
2 The Asian Tigers refer to Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan (the mature Tigers), Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand (the new Tigers) and China (a new Tiger but in a class of its own).  
3 The correspondence is not exact, since trade is driven by other factors apart from growth in production and 
demand. In particular, the relocation of products like textiles and clothing, which tend to grow relatively slowly 
in production, has led to relatively healthy rates of growth in trade.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 8  
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lead taken by the East Asian Tigers (the only exception was Hong Kong, which has de-
industrialized rapidly). Even China, with its vast  labour  reserves, enjoyed rapid  hi-tech 
production  growth (in fact, the world’s  fastest): a simple two-factor model  clearly cannot 
capture the complexities of industrial development.  The NSB data do not, unfortunately, 
show African countries separately, but we provide other data below.  
Box 2: Drivers of competitive advantage today 
Patterns of competitive advantage are changing as exports grow in response to two forces: innovation and the relocation of 
activities, processes or functions to lower cost areas. Both play a role in most industries, but their importance differs by 
technology and physical characteristics.  
§  Some products (e.g. pharmaceuticals) grow rapidly mainly because of rapid innovation; there is little relocation to 
take advantage of low wages because of the continuous processes involved in production and the extremely 
stringent technical demands on the intermediate inputs.  
§  Some products (e.g. electronics) benefit from both innovation and relocation – they enjoy rapid demand growth, 
substitute for older products and also have low-technology assembly processes that can be placed in poor countries.  
§  Some products (like apparel) are driven primarily by relocation. The overall growth of production and technical 
change are relatively slow.  
§  Some products (like automobiles) have discrete, ‘separable’ processes that can undergo relocation. However, their 
technological complexity and ‘weight’ (critical components are, unlike electronics, heavy in relation to their value) 
means that distances across which processes are fragmented are fairly small (Lall, Albaladejo and Zhang, 2004).  
Products for which neither innovation nor relocation are relevant tend to grow slowly in trade. One of the secrets of rapid 
export growth is therefore to enter product segments where the process of relocation is very active and demand is growing 
rapidly. This was just what the East Asian Tigers managed to do.  
Fragmentation and relocation are dynamic processes, and, with new technologies, new forms are appearing constantly. The 
service area, for example, is experiencing a veritable explosion of relocation. Functions like call centres, back-office services 
and even R&D are being relocated in  low wage countries, though most of these are concentrating in India and China 
(UNCTAD, 2004). 














Returning to trade, high technology exports are not the preserve of industrialized countries. 
Contrary to conventional trade theory, the lead of developing countries over developed ones QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 9  
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rises with technological complexity, and is highest in high technology products, led by ICT 
products (Figure 5). This surprising statistic is not due to the small starting base of complex 
exports: HT products are also  the largest category of developing country exports  today 
(Figure 5). By 2002, developing countries accounted for over 35% of global hi-tech exports.  
HT products raised their share of developing world manufactured exports from 11% in 1985 
to 33% in 2000. By contrast, the largest category in 1985, resource based products, saw its 
share halve from 34% to 17% in this period. The share of low technology products also fell 
from 33% to 24% (UNIDO, 2004).  
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Export success, however, has been highly concentrated in the developing world. East Asia 
accounts for over 70% of its total manufactured exports and over 90% of its HT exports (we 
return to African performance below). Within East Asia, electronics account for over one-
third of total exports (up from 18% in 1990). At the country level, the leading 15 exporters 
accounted for 94% of its  manufactured exports in 2001, up from 91% in 1990 (UNIDO, 
2004). Figure 6 shows the values of exports and growth rates over 1990-2001 for the 15 
developing world leaders.  
The most dynamic large exporters hail mainly from East Asia, with Mexico a recent entrant 
because of the formation of NAFTA. All these exporters used high technology products to 
drive their success, and all participated in global production networks, with all but Korea 
and Taiwan relying on developed country MNCs for this insertion. Even China, with its many 
state-owned enterprises, relied heavily on MNCs to lead HT exports. UNCTAD estimates 
that over 80% of such exports came from foreign affiliates by 2001 (UNCTAD 2002). Korea 
and Taiwan tapped global production at arm’s length, but only by building up very strong 
domestic capabilities (skills, R&D, institutions and infrastructure) (Lall and Urata, 2003).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 10  
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To sum up on the global setting, the industrial environment has changed significantly since 
the early days of development. Rapid technical change, liberalization, shrinking economic 
distance and spreading global production networks  are  altering  the way enterprises and 
countries compete.  The outcome is an enormously expanded range of opportunities of 
production, exports and specialization offset by intense competition, rising minimum 
capability needs and the need to enter global value chains. Developing countries can succeed 
in this new setting, but only if they are able to meet these needs, compete in export markets 
and tap fast-growing  segments of trade.  Two crucial needs are therefore to build the 
necessary technological capabilities to compete and to attract FDI. Technological effort and 
FDI promotion are now vital to industrial success.  
The rationale for attracting FDI is fairly obvious and does not need further discussion. That 
for undertaking technological effort (or building technological capabilities) needs a brief 
discussion.  
4. DOES AFRICA NEED TECHNOLOGICAL EFFORT TO 
INDUSTRIALIZE? 
There is a widespread belief that ‘technology’ is an activity reserved for developed countries. 
Developing countries only need to import existing knowledge from them in the form of 
machinery, equipment, designs, patents and blueprints. In simplified models with efficient 
markets, all they need to do to tap new technologies efficiently is to liberalize and wait for the 
right technologies to flow in to suit their factor endowments. No further technological effort 
is needed (they do not need to ‘reinvent the wheel’); static comparative advantage is the same 
as dynamic comparative advantage, and as their factor price-ratios change their trade 
structure will adjust automatically and instantaneously. In sum, technology does not raise 
significant policy issues in developing countries.  
This depiction is misleading. Developing countries do not generally ‘innovate’ in the sense of 
creating new products or processes. They do, however, have to invest in technological effort: QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 11  
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to acquire, master, adapt and improve upon existing technologies.  This effort is often quite 
significant. In fact, developing countries often have to undertake greater effort than their 
counterparts in advanced economies because their absorptive capacities are much lower. 
Absorbing technologies is not a trivial or costless task, and industrial success depends on how 
well the process is managed. Since all countries have access to the same international 
technical knowledge, a critical determinant of industrial performance is technological 
‘learning’ by different countries. It is critical to the argument of this chapter to understand 
this phenomenon.  
While technological hardware (equipment, designs, patents and so on)  is available to all 
countries, just importing the hardware does not ensure that it is used efficiently. This is 
because the disembodied elements of technology (‘tacit’ knowledge) cannot be transferred 
like physical products. Technical knowledge is difficult to locate, price and evaluate. Its 
transfer cannot be embodied in equipment or instructions, designs or blueprints. Unlike the 
sale of a good, where the transaction is complete when physical delivery has taken place, the 
successful transfer of technology is a prolonged process, involving local learning to complete 
the transaction. The embodied elements can be used at best practice l evels only if they are 
complemented by a number of tacit elements that must be developed locally. The need for 
learning exists in all cases, even when the seller of the technology provides assistance, though 
the costs vary by technology, firm and country (Lall, 2001). Learning calls for conscious, 
purposive efforts  — to collect new information, ‘try things out’, create new skills and 
routines and strike new external relationships. This process is located in the production 
facility and embodied in the institutional setting of the enterprise. This process is strikingly 
different from textbook depictions of technology transfer. 
Enterprise technological learning does not take place in isolation: it is rife with externalities 
and  inter-linkages. The most important interactions are those with suppliers of inputs or 
capital goods, competitors, customers, consultants and technology suppliers. Linkages also 
occur with firms in unrelated industries, technology institutes, extension services and 
universities, industry associations and training institutions. Many linkages are informal and 
not mediated by markets. Not all are deliberate or cooperative: some involve imitating and 
stealing knowledge. Where information and skill flows cohere around a set of related 
activities, ‘clusters’ of industries emerge, with collective learning in the group. These 
externalities raise clear issues for policy, since free markets cannot deal satisfactorily with 
them.  
The ability of a country to undertake effective technological effort depends on a complex 
interaction between  its incentive system, factor markets and institutions. The interaction is 
context specific. It reflects national policies, resources, support institutions, infrastructure, 
skills, business practices and history. Policies on trade, competition and labour, for instance, 
affect learning by each firm by influencing the signals it receives from the market. The 
resource base affects the relative cost and benefit of different learning trajectories. Support 
institutions affect h ow firms meet the information, skill, finance and other needs that are 
difficult to satisfy in open markets. Infrastructure determines the cost of operation and 
interacting with the outside world. The skill base that firms draw upon determines what and 
how they learn. The social and business setting, the product of past experience and tradition, 
is also very important; it affects how firms relate to each other and cooperate.  
5. AFRICAN INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE  
Figure 7 shows the share of Sub-Saharan Africa (including South Africa) in global MVA QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 12  
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over 1980-2000. This  share declines from 1.0% to 0.82% over the two decades; without 
South Africa, it declines from 0.43% to 0.41% (UNIDO database). Figure 8 shows the values 
of per capita MVA in the developing regions, again with a declining value for SSA (SSA1 
includes South Africa and SSA2 excludes it).
4  
The  weak performance of African manufacturing in terms of values and world shares is 
reinforced by data on its technology composition. MVA in SSA2, excluding South Africa
5, is 
heavily biased towards resource-based activities (Figure 9). The share of medium and high 
technology (MHT) activities is very low and declines over time. In contrast, most other 
developing regions raise the MHT share. East Asia without China (EA 2) and China both 
have a preponderance of MHT activities.  The  lack of upgrading  in African industry is 
particularly worrying in light of global trends in industrial development.   
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Figure 10 shows the leading countries in terms of shares of RB manufacturing in Africa; the 
share of South Africa is slightly higher here (58%) than for total MVA. Other countries are 
much smaller producers.  
                                                 
4 The acronyms are: EA is East Asia, LAC is Latin America & the Caribbean, MENA is the Middle East and 
North Africa, SSA is Sub-Saharan Africa.  
5 South Africa accounted for 44% of SSA MVA in 2000, down from 53.7% in 1990 and 57% in 1980.  
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Figure 10: Top ten resource-based producers in Africa (by share of African RB MVA, 1980-2000)














6. AFRICAN EXPORT PERFORMANCE  
Figure 11 shows export market shares for Africa and other regions. SSA does not perform 
well: with South Africa included, it only accounts for 0.6% of world manufactured exports in 
2000, marginally down from 0.7% in 1981 but slightly up from 0.4% in 1990. Without South 
Africa, the share declines from 0.3% in 1981 to 0.1% in 1990, then recovers slightly to 0.2% 
in 2000. Most of the recovery is in the early half of the 1990s – the later half is stagnant.  
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These two decades see massive rises in exports by East Asia as a whole, its world market 
shares going from 6.8% in 1981 to 18.4% in 2000. Within this total, China’s WMS has risen 
from 1.0% to 6.5%. South Asia has also had a steady rise, if at much more modest levels. 
Latin America without Mexico has seen a fall in WMS over the 1980s and a rise in the 1990s 
but not to the levels reached in 1981; MENA had performed the same way. Mexico’s export QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 14  
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prospects have altered dramatically in the 1990s with the formation of NAFTA and the boom 
in its maquiladoras (assembly operations) on the US border.  
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Figure 12 shows the WMS of African exports by technology categories in the 1990s. SSA2 
(excluding South Africa) raises its total market share (including primary products), with large 
gains in primary products and resource-based manufactures  Within the latter category, the 
main gains are in petroleum and other mineral-based products; its WMS for agro-based RB 
products remains stagnant. However, it loses shares in complex (medium and hi-tech) 
manufactured  products. South Africa loses shares in primary products as well as  low 
technology and high technology manufactures, while gaining in resource-based and medium 
technology manufactures. Its overall market share declines slightly.   
Table 1: Shares of South Africa and Mauritius in African exports  
   South Africa   Mauritius  
   1980  1990  2000  1980  1990  2000 
Total Exports   49.2%  70.8%  29.7%  2.0%  5.8%  1.9% 
Primary products  33.2%  58.8%  9.7%  0.1%  0.3%  0.0% 
Total manufactures  68.4%  76.5%  57.6%  4.4%  8.4%  4.6% 
Resource based  60.9%  78.9%  45.6%  4.6%  6.0%  1.7% 
    Agricultural Based  53.7%  61.8%  43.0%  13.9%  15.7%  4.8% 
    Mineral Based  64.3%  87.9%  46.7%  0.1%  1.0%  0.4% 
Low Technology   82.8%  58.0%  48.1%  6.8%  20.5%  20.3% 
    Fashion Cluster  58.3%  35.5%  25.1%  20.4%  45.3%  37.6% 
    Other LT  93.6%  74.7%  72.5%  0.8%  2.0%  2.1% 
Medium Technology   91.0%  88.2%  86.1%  1.3%  1.9%  0.7% 
    Automotive  92.6%  96.6%  92.0%  0.0%  0.4%  0.1% 
    Process  92.1%  86.0%  84.0%  0.2%  0.6%  0.3% 
    Engineering  87.6%  88.2%  84.7%  4.3%  6.6%  1.6% 
High Technology   69.8%  91.4%  87.1%  0.8%  1.4%  1.3% 
    Electronic  80.1%  94.9%  92.5%  2.7%  1.6%  0.4% 
    Other HT  66.0%  89.9%  83.8%  0.0%  1.3%  1.8% 
South Africa and Mauritius the two main ‘outliers’  in Africa in terms of manufactured export 
performance. Table 1 shows the shares of these two countries in total African exports. 
Mauritius is particularly notable because, despite its small size (population of 1 million) and QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 15  
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lack of an industrial base, it has performed rather like an Asian Tiger, with spectacular 
growth in apparel exports (Lall and Wignaraja, 1998). However, this growth is coming to an 
end because of high wages; as a result, Mauritian exporters are relocating in low wages 
neighbours like Madagascar. The ending of the MFA will erode competitiveness further, 
unless Mauritian firms upgrade their quality significantly ahead of China and South Asia.  
Within manufacturing, the structure of African exports reflects the overwhelming role of 
resource-based products (primary products and resource-based manufactures) as compared to 
‘pure’ manufactures (low, medium and high technology) (Figure 13). East Asia has raised the 
share of pure manufactures to levels even higher than industrialized countries, based on its 
stellar performance in low as well as high technology products. LAC remains more 
dependent on resources but raises the share of manufactures rapidly. MENA, like SSA, 
remains primarily resource based.  
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It is useful to distinguish the export structure of the main sub-regions within Africa (Figure 
14): we exclude South Africa and then South Africa and Mauritius (the latter is an outlier 
because of its success in apparel exports). We also divide Africa into coastal countries (non-
resource based economies including South Africa and Mauritius), land-locked countries and 
resource-based countries. The groups are taken from UNIDO (2004).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 16  
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The coastal (non resource-based) countries have more reliance on pure manufactures than 
other countries, but the  export  structure is still highly reliant on  natural  resources. The 
predominantly resource-based countries are, expectedly, almost wholly dependent on such 
exports, with  hardly any  ‘pure’ manufactured exports. Figure 15 shows the structure of 
exports by selected African countries (Nigeria is excluded because of the absence of recent 
trade data), reinforcing the impression that  the region is concentrated in resource-based 
products that offer relatively limited prospects of growth and technology development, and 
that often suffer from volatile and declining prices 
Table 2 shows  upgrading in the export structure of Africa relative to other regions, as 
measured by the change in the share of medium and high technology products in total or QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 17  
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manufactured exports over 1980-2000. This is a better indicator of the responsiveness of 
African countries to world trade and technology, the depth of their industrial capabilities and 
their ability to tap the dynamics of evolving comparative advantage. East Asia and LAC lead 
the world in terms of structural upgrading of exports over these two decades; however, the 
Latin American result is strongly biased by Mexican performance, and the rest of LAC has a 
relatively stagnant structure (Lall, Albaladejo and Moreira, 2004).  
Table 2: Upgrading of export structure by region, and in Africa and East Asia  
   In total exports   In manufactured exports  
   1980-1990  1990-2000  1980-1990  1990-2000 
World  14.0%  4.9%  9.4%  4.8% 
Industrialized  12.7%  5.1%  9.9%  4.6% 
Developing  34.4%  16.4%  31.1%  16.0% 
EA8  42.3%  21.2%  37.6%  20.0% 
EA9  36.6%  18.4%  31.6%  16.5% 
LAC  36.8%  23.9%  46.8%  21.6% 
MENA  7.7%  1.6%  13.0%  3.3% 
SSA  (total)  4.7%  -6.7%  12.8%  1.2% 
SSA excl South Africa   0.8%  0.3%  3.9%  -5.1% 
SSA excl South Africa & Mauritius   0.9%  0.5%  4.4%  -9.7% 
South Africa & Mauritius   20.1%  10.8%  20.3%  10.7% 
SSA Coastal  14.4%  6.6%  18.2%  8.9% 
SSA Landlocked  6.6%  -4.7%  10.9%  -27.1% 
SSA Resource-based  0.5%  -0.6%  3.3%  -12.4% 
Mauritius  0.1%  -1.6%  0.1%  -1.7% 
South Africa  21.6%  11.4%  22.1%  11.0% 
Togo  3.0%  3.7%  7.9%  5.6% 
Kenya  2.5%  -8.5%  9.4%  -12.0% 
Madagascar  -1.0%  -1.1%  -7.9%  -4.3% 
Senegal  0.3%  3.4%  1.0%  8.8% 
Malawi  1.2%  0.3%  7.4%  -1.8% 
Cameroon  0.0%  -2.9%  -2.1%  -16.5% 
Zimbabwe  -5.8%  -6.0%  -16.2%  -15.7% 
Hong Kong  3.9%  -4.4%  4.5%  -3.7% 
Indonesia  23.0%  17.8%  30.2%  21.7% 
Korea  34.2%  17.9%  34.2%  18.3% 
Malaysia  55.4%  29.3%  48.7%  23.9% 
Philippines  73.4%  55.5%  75.5%  52.8% 
Singapore  41.7%  17.5%  37.0%  15.9% 
Taiwan  37.8%  20.6%  37.8%  20.0% 
Thailand  42.8%  25.4%  33.3%  24.4% 
Notes: ‘Upgrading’ is defined as the rise in the share of medium and high technology products in total or manufactured 
exports. EA 8 includes Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan; EA 9 also includes China.  
Africa as a whole lags other developing regions in terms of export upgrading, though its 
performance in the 1980s is quite respectable. However, the breakdown of Africa shows that 
this is due largely to South Africa. Without South Africa, there is relatively little upgrading; 
the landlocked and resource-rich countries perform particularly poorly. At the country level, 
several retrogress technologically, particularly in the 1990s when liberalization starts to take 
hold. By contrast, all countries in East Asia, with the exception of Hong Kong, show 
vigorous upgrading in their export structures.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 18  
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Figure 16 shows the trends in values of manufactured exports by the regions, and Figure 17 
the technology composition of exports by SSA3 (i.e. excluding South Africa and Mauritius). 
The stagnation of African exports is strikingly obvious in the former. The latter shows 
interesting differences in export composition by destination. Exports to industrialized 
countries are more primary-product intensive than those to developing countries as a whole, 
and even more than exports to other African countries. However, over time the share of 
primary products rises in exports to the rest of Africa rises, while that of RB manufactures 
falls. African exports have higher shares of ‘pure’ manufactures than to other regions, with 
LT and MT products taking about equal shares. This is line with expectations that exports by 
African countries to countries at similar levels of development would be more complex than 
exports to industrialized countries; however, manufactures play a very small role in intra-
African exports and even less in exports to other developing countries.  
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In sum, therefore, these data suggest very low levels of industrial and export capabilities in QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 19  
1 19 9   
much of Africa. While intra-regional trade seems to offer better prospects of upgrading, two 
factors have to be borne in mind. First, the regional market is relatively small and slow-
growing, poorly linked by infrastructure, and volatile. It will not be sufficient to drive 
sustained export growth within Africa, though some industries may well benefit. Second, 
while local exporters have a transport cost and information advantage compared to other 
exporters to Africa, unless local firms can match others in terms of price, quality and 
technology, they will lose market share. After all, no African country will willingly buy more 
expensive or poorer quality products from other African countries if they have a choice – 
which they will increasingly as the region opens up.  
Table 3: Correlation coefficients of export structures of Africa (all exports) 
  1980  1990  2000  Change 1980-2000 
Developing  0.953  0.768  0.612  (0.341) 
EA8  0.819  0.015  (0.174)  (0.992) 
EA9  0.819  0.108  (0.194)  (1.013) 
SSA1 (ex South Africa)  0.983  0.864  0.994  0.011 
SSA3 (ex South Africa +M)  0.982  0.891  0.995  0.013 
South Africa + Mauritius  0.939  0.965  0.616  (0.323) 
SSA Coastal  0.952  0.998  0.901  (0.051) 
SSA Landlocked  0.948  0.808  0.981  0.032 
SSA Resource-based  0.955  0.793  0.990  0.034 
Finally, we correlate the export structures of Africa as a whole with subgroups in Africa and 
other regions, including individual Asian countries (the exercise is at the 3-digit  level of 
SITC revision 2). The higher the correlation coefficient, the more similar are the export 
structures; over time, a positive figure for the 
change in the coefficient indicates that structures 
are growing more similar. Table 3 shows the 
coefficients for 1980, 1990 and 2000. 
Interestingly, the export structures of East Asia 
and Africa were fairly similar in 1980. Over time, 
they diverged significantly and by 2000 there was 
a negative correlation between them.  
Table 4 shows only the changes in correlation of 
African exports structure with other regions and 
countries. The structure for the region as a whole 
evolved differently from EA as a whole and from 
Asian countries (with the exception of Hong 
Kong), all developing countries, all industrialized 
countries, South Africa and coastal African 
countries.  
These data reinforce earlier findings:  not only is 
Africa performing poorly in competitive terms, its 
export structure is at variance with trends globally 
and in the most dynamic exporters in the world. 
The latter conclusion is as worrying as the former: 
if export structures were geared to  fast growth, 
slow export growth could have been remedied by 
removing immediate constraints like poor 
business climate, weak infrastructure, lack of 
Table 4: Changes in correlation of export 
structures of Africa with other regions and 
countries (1980-2000) (all exports) 
EA9  (1.013) 
EA8  (0.992) 
Malaysia  (0.914) 
Thailand  (0.875) 
Singapore  (0.715) 
Philippines  (0.658) 
Industrialized  (0.589) 
Developing  (0.341) 
South Africa  (0.325) 
Korea  (0.130) 
Mauritius  (0.115) 
Indonesia  (0.096) 
Taiwan  (0.062) 
SSA Coastal  (0.051) 
Senegal  0.001 
SSA1(ex South Africa)  0.011 
SSA3(ex South Africa + M)  0.013 
Togo  0.016 
SSA Landlocked  0.032 
SSA Resource Based  0.034 
Madagascar  0.039 
Cameroon  0.040 
Kenya  0.047 
Malawi  0.055 
Zimbabwe  0.064 
Hong Kong  0.067 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 20  
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financing, and so on. If, however, the structures are not conducive to growth, there is a more 
difficult problem of shifting into more dynamic activities, with far-reaching implications for 
building skills, industrial capabilities, attracting different forms of FDI and engaging in 
different forms of technological activity.  
Finally, we consider the ‘market positioning’ of African manufactured exports as compared 
to East Asia, using a schema drawn from the business strategy literature (Box 3).  
Box 3: Analysing market positioning 
The analysis of market positioning is based on analyzing 
trends in the shares of a country’s exports in dynamic or 
stagnant products in world trade and the country’s overall 
competitive position in whether it is gaining or losing 
market share.  
ﬂ “Champions”: exports with strong competitiveness 
(i.e. rising world market shares) in dynamic products 
that are  growing faster than total trade. This is the 
most desirable, or ‘optimal’, export positioning.  
ﬂ “Underachievers”: exports with rising market share 
in non-dynamic products. This  signifies weak 
positioning, since competitive advantages are 
concentrated in areas where they may not yield high 
growth rates.  
ﬂ “Achievers in adversity”: exports in decline (falling market shares) in dynamic products. This is the ‘weakest’ market 
position, as it shows the inability of the country to develop advantages in dynamic products.    
ﬂ “Declining sectors”: exports that are losing market shares in non-dynamic products. This is a relatively desirable 
category, since it shows ‘restructuring’ away from a weak position and in fact amounts to a strategic retreat. However, 
if this category is very large, it could signify a weak overall export structure.  
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The two figures show the market positioning of the top 20 exports by East Asia and Africa. The size of the bubble shows the 
value of the export and the position in the quadrant its relative positioning. There is a horizontal line shows the average rate 
of growth of world exports. There are very few ‘champions’ in Africa as compared to East Asia and the dominant one, 
precious and semi-precious gems, is a primary product with a relatively modest growth rate and facing volatile markets. 
Other champions are based on oil or emanate from South Africa (passenger cars and pumps); one export, aircraft, is clearly a 
re-export as no African country makes aerospace equipment. There are quite a few achievers in adversity. In East Asia, by 
contrast, there are a large number of champions, and most of these are high technology products. The African market 
positioning, South Africa apart, is not very promising as far as manufactured products go. 
Market Positioning Classification 
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7. AFRICAN COMPETITIVE LAGS: FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS 
Africa is commonly  perceived to have  poor framework conditions for  growth and 
competitiveness: social and political disturbance,  ethnic conflict,  weak governance and 
corruption, distance from major markets and fragmented markets within the region, poor 
macroeconomic management, deficient infrastructure, or simply being located in the tropics.
6 
In addition, many African countries have high business costs that make entry and growth 
difficult for private investors, especially for the small and tiny ones that comprise the vast 
bulk of local entrepreneurs.
7  
It is indisputable that such framework and initial conditions  matter for African industrial 
performance: p olitical, social and economic instability, corruption and impediments to 
investment, high transport costs or poor infrastructure all  affect the growth and full 
exploitation of capacities and capabilities. UNIDO (2004) compares conditions in Africa 
today with those in selected high performing developing economies (HPEs) in the recent 
past,
8 and finds that: 
“Initial conditions, including non-economic factors such as geography, ethnic 
diversity, civil unrest and educational capital have been found to have profound 
effects on economic performance and development of countries. Controlling for 
other factors such as initial levels of income, a comparison with the initial conditions 
prevalent in the HPEs at their point of take-off suggests that non-economic initial 
conditions in SSA represent a cost in terms of foregone growth of between 0.6 and 
1.6 percentage points. Initial conditions in economic and factor markets result in a 
                                                 
6 See, for instance, Collier and Gunning (1999), Devarajan et al. (2002), and Sachs and Bloom (1998).  
7 See country level scores for legal regulations on business in World Bank (2004).  
8 These economies are Chile, China, Korea, Indonesia, India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam, 
Mauritius and Bangladesh.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 22  
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further 0.4 to 1.1 percentage points in forgone growth.  
“Some of the most important sources of forgone growth  are low life expectancy 
(between 0.2 and 0.6 percentage points), adverse geography (between 0.3 and 0.5 
percentage points) and real exchange rate distortions, which can be taken as a proxy 
for institutional quality (between 0.4 and 0.7 percentage points). Because the six 
HPEs are located entirely within the tropics, the proportion of land between the 
tropics does not appear to have been a constraint on subsequent growth. However, 
an index of the coastline to land area shows that SSA is in a very disadvantageous 
position compared to the HPEs because the majority of SSA countries do not have 
access to natural ports or waterways… SSA is at a considerable disadvantage 
relative to HPEs in respect of income distribution… The analysis of the impact of 
initial educational attainment in HPEs shows that the majority of SSA countries are 
currently lagging, sometimes significantly, behind the initial enrolment rates of all 
HPEs, with the exception of Bangladesh and China… Finally, the main source of 
lost growth in SSA arises from the difference in life expectancy between SSA and 
the HPEs. Although life expectancy is used here as an overall proxy for comparing 
health conditions, there is no doubt that pandemics such as HIV/AIDS and 
tuberculosis pose major public health challenges with serious fiscal implications for 
SSA countries."
9 
Since these issues have been extensively discussed in the analytical and policy literature on 
Africa, there is little need here to analyse them further here. We accept their relevance and 
significance to industrial development, but believe that they do not account fully for the weak 
competitive and technological performance of African manufacturing. There are, in our view, 
structural factors – related to technology, skills and FDI – that also play a very important role.  
However, in terms of the business environment (as measured by the World Bank), SSA does 
not fare badly relative to other developing regions. Table 5 shows recent data on selected 
measures of the business climate: Africa is clearly not the worst performer on any of the 
indices. In fact, on several it does better than East Asia. Its competitive lag is clearly not due 
to onerous regulations.   
Table 5: Business environment in SSA and other developing regions (circa January 2003) 
  No. of start-up 
procedures 





Cost to enforce 
contract (% GNI) 
Labour regulations 
(from 0, less rigid, 
to 100, most rigid) 
SSA   11  72  278  52  53 
EA and Pacific  10  80  819  77  49 
LAC   12  78  90  39  62 
MENA   12  56  1,286  14  50 
S Asia   9  45  86  93  49 
Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2004, Table 5.3 
By contrast, in terms of  investment risk Africa does consistently w orse than other regions 
(Table 6). This is important in that it deters inflows of foreign capital (including FDI, on 
which more below), an important input into competitive development.   
                                                 
9 UNIDO (2004), pp. 57-58.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 23  
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Sound framework conditions are necessary to healthy industrial development. However, they 
are not sufficient if there are structural lags, where, in other words, economies cannot respond 
to market stimuli because they lack the capabilities needed to become internationally 
competitive. Some capabilities are conditioned by framework conditions (as noted, FDI will 
not come if risks are very high), but their development faces an independent set of market 
and institutional failures, and policy must address these directly. The next section deals with 
these issues, drawing on the East Asian experience.  
8. STRUCTURAL FACTORS IN COMPETITIVENESS: TECHNOLOGY, 
SKILLS AND FDI  
8.1 ANALYTICAL BACKGROUND
10 
Domestic technological effort and FDI are both vital to competitiveness, and both need a 
strong base of skills. We explained above the role of technological effort in competitiveness; 
we now turn to the relationship between FDI and local effort. Technological effort is needed 
in all developing countries to implement new technologies efficiently, regardless of the 
ownership  of the factory, and such effort has to build on technologies imported from 
advanced countries. What difference does FDI make to the transfer and absorption of new 
technology and to export competitiveness?  
Access to new technologies  takes two broad forms:  internalized (from a multinational 
company to its affiliates) and externalized (between independent firms). While internalized 
modes necessarily involve MNCs, externalized ones may also involve MNCs selling 
technologies (they are in fact the largest sellers of technology on licence). However, there are 
other sources of technology: national enterprises without overseas investments, consultants, 
capital goods producers, research institutions or governments. The sale can take a variety of 
forms: minority joint ventures, franchising, turnkey projects, sale of equipment, licences, 
technical assistance, subcontracting or original equipment manufacturing arrangements. 
Internalized transfers bring a package of supporting inputs to ensure their efficient 
deployment. Externalized transfers may involve additional inputs by the technology seller, 
but generally tend to call for greater learning effort by the recipient.  
The MNCs that dominate global FDI are also the main source of industrial innovation. In fact, 
innovation is often the main factor that allows them to become (and remain) multinational. 
Despite the growth of technology start-ups, concentration in R&D remains high. For instance, 
in 1997 the largest 2% (by employment) of manufacturing companies undertaking R&D in 
the USA accounted for nearly 80% of industrial R&D spending. As the major innovators, it is 
                                                 
10 This section draws on Lall (2003).  
Table 6: Investment risk ratings (late 2003) 
  Composite ICRG risk rating  Institutional Investor credit 
rating  
Euromoney country credit-
worthiness rating  
SSA    
58.0 
17.5  28.7 
EA and Pacific  66.6  29.6  38.7 
LAC   65.0  30.0  43.3 
MENA   70.5  38.5  44.1 
S Asia   63.5  27.4  37.8 
Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2004, Table 5.2 
Note: Higher values indicate better risk performance.   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 24  
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not surprising  MNCs are also the main sources of technology transfer in non-FDI forms – 
they choose the mode of transfer to maximize the value of their technological assets, 
internalizing the most valuable ones and selling older or less profitable ones at arm’s length. 
Before considering transfers to developing countries, let us highlight features of recent FDI 
(Box 4).  
Box 4: Salient features of recent FDI 
•  FDI flows are growing faster than other economic aggregates like national gross fixed capital formation, world trade 
and GDP. International production (by MNCs and affiliates) is steadily increasing its share in global production.  
•  MNCs increasingly dominate world trade: around two-thirds of visible trade is handled by MNCs, and the share is 
growing particularly in activities with significant scale economies in production, marketing or innovation.  
•  Of the visible trade handled by MNCs, between 30 and 40 percent is within MNC systems, between affiliates and 
parents or among affiliates. Such internalized trade contains the most dynamic exports today, moving within integrated 
international production systems, where MNCs locate different functions or stages of production to different countries. 
Affiliates participating in such systems produce at massive scales and use the latest technologies, skills and managerial 
techniques. Examples of complex integrated systems in which developing countries are important are automobiles 
(mainly in Mexico, Brazil and Argentina) and electronics (Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Mexico) (Lall, 
Albaladejo and Zhang, 2004). The globalisation of the value chain is likely to spread across many other industries, and 
linking local production chains to them will become a major source of growth, technology transfer and skill 
development. 
•  Some MNCs are locating non-production functions like accounting, engineering, R&D or marketing to affiliates – these 
are high value activities that feed into manufacturing competitiveness and local capabilities. However, the transfer of 
functions such as R&D lags that of production, particularly in developing countries. Over 90 percent of overseas R&D 
by US MNCs is in other industrial countries. MNCs from smaller countries are more international in terms of relocating 
R&D overseas, but MNCs from economies like the UK are also conducting very substantial amount of R&D overseas. 
However, much of such R&D remains confined to other industrial countries. For such deep integration to occur, host 
countries have to be able to provide not just cheap labour but the whole array of modern skills, infrastructure, 
institutions, efficient business practices and supplier networks that MNCs need to be fully competitive in world markets. 
Very few developing countries are able to meet these needs. 
•  Large companies with transnational operations increasingly dominate the process of innovation: the creation of new 
technologies and organizational methods that lies at the core of competitiveness in all but the simplest activities. About 
90 per cent of world R&D expenditure is in the OECD. Within this group, seven countries (led by the USA) account for 
90 per cent, the USA alone for 40 per cent. Access to new technologies thus involves  getting knowledge from 
technological leaders in these countries. Many are increasingly unwilling to part with their most valuable technologies 
without a substantial equity stake. Thus, FDI becomes the most important – often the only – way of obtaining leading 
edge technologies.  
•  MNCs are often central to exports by local firms, particularly of technology-intensive products. Many such products are 
difficult to export independently because of the need for costly branding, distribution and after-sales servicing. Thus, 
60-70 percent of consumer electronics made by Korea and Taiwan is sold to MNCs on an OEM (original equipment 
manufacture) basis. The significance of OEM for Korea is shown by the following statistics. In 1985, over 40% of 
Korean exports were in the form of OEM. In 1989, around 50-60% of VCR and TV, and about 80% of PC, exports by 
Korea were under OEM. In 1990, 70-80% of total Korean electronics exports were under OEM. MNCs are also active 
in  exports of low technology products where factors like scale economies, branding, distribution and design are 
important.  
•  MNCs can help restructure and upgrade competitive capabilities in import-substituting activities. Where the facilities 
are already foreign owned, MNCs are often better able to respond to liberalization than local firms by investing in new 
technologies and skills. They can also help local suppliers to upgrade, or attract investment by their suppliers overseas. 
This has been commonly found in Latin America. Where local firms own the facilities, MNCs help them to upgrade 
through mergers and acquisitions (M&As). While cross-border M&As are often regarded with suspicion or resentment, 
they can salvage existing facilities that would not survive in a liberalised environment. In fact, with globalization and 
liberalization, international M&As now constitutes the bulk of FDI flows, accounting for over 80 percent of FDI in 
developed countries and around one-third in developing ones (UNCTAD 2000).  
•  FDI in services is rising rapidly as formerly homebound providers (as in utilities) globalise activities and take advantage 
of liberalization and privatization in their industries. The entry of service MNCs can provide rapid improvements in the 
productivity and efficiency to host economies, not only in their industries but also to their customers (many of which 
are important exporters.  
In general, internalized technology flows are a very efficient means of transferring a package 
of capital, skills, information and brand names to developing countries. For many new 
technologies, internalized transfers are the only possible mode of transfer, since innovators 
are unwilling to part with them to unrelated parties. Even where technologies are available at 
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knowledge involved because of the commitment of the transferor and its capability to support 
learning. If the technology is changing rapidly, internalization provides the most direct access 
to improvements. If the activity is export-oriented, internalized transfers offer the additional 
advantages of international marketing skills and networks, established brand names or, of 
increasing relevance, access to integrated production structures spanning several countries.  
However, internalized technology transfer may also have costs. Profits are realised by the 
MNC on the package as a whole rather than just the innovation component. If the host 
country already possesses other elements of the package, it is cheaper to buy the technology 
separately (countries like Korea and Taiwan did this because their enterprises had the 
necessary capabilities to master the technology). In general, the more standardised and 
diffused the technology and the more capable the buyer, the more economical will 
externalized modes be. However, there is a more subtle reason: the existence of learning 
benefits, deepening and externalities may tilt the choice in favour of externalisation even for 
relatively complex and difficult technologies. In such activities, reliance on foreign 
investment can shorten the learning period but reduce the other benefits of technology 
transfer and capability building.   
A useful way to analyse this is to divide technological capabilities into four levels. At the 
bottom are the simplest (operational) ones, needed for running a technology efficiently: these 
involve basic manufacturing skills as well as some more demanding troubleshooting, quality 
control, maintenance and procurement skills. At the intermediate level are duplicative skills, 
which include the investment capabilities needed to expand capacity and to purchase and 
integrate foreign technologies. Next come adaptive skills, where imported technologies are 
adapted and improved, and design skills for more complex engineering learned. Finally come 
innovative skills, based on formal R&D, that are needed to keep pace with technological 
frontiers or to generate new technologies.  
The advantage of internalised forms lies in the long-term commitment of the foreign partner 
to the project and its ability to provide the elements needed to  operationalise new 
technologies. MNCs have important advantages over local firms in creating the capabilities to 
use new technologies. They have mastered and used the technologies elsewhere; they may 
have created the technology in the first place. They have large reserves of skill, technical 
support, experience and finance to design and implement learning. They invest in upgrading 
local skills, technological capabilities and supply chains, if only to the extent that it is 
profitable in commercial terms (to implement production technologies). They have access to 
major export markets, established marketing channels and well-known brand names. They 
can transfer particular components or processes from a production chain to a developing 
country and integrate it into an international system. This is much more difficult for local 
firms, not just because they may not have the experience or competence – they inevitably 
face higher transaction and coordination costs in integrating into MNC corporate systems. 
As capability development progresses to the top level, where local innovative efforts become 
viable, there can be a conflict of interest between the host country and the foreign investor. 
Internalized technology transfer and local capability development can, in other words, 
become competitive rather than complementary. There are good reasons for international 
investors to keep innovative work centralized at home or in a few developed countries; these 
reasons include ease of coordination, skill availability, proximity to main markets, and more 
advanced science and technology infrastructures. At the same time, it is important for 
countries at a certain stage of industrial development to deepen their capabilities and move 
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whereas the sustained technological growth of developing countries calls for increasing local 
innovation. There is clear scope of a clash between the social interests of the host economy 
and the private interests of MNCs. At this stage, there may be a case for restricting reliance 
on internalized forms to promote local R&D capabilities based on externalized forms or for 
intervening in the FDI process to induce MNCs to transfer m ore advanced technological 
functions. However, as MNCs start to globalize the process of R&D, and as the costs and 
risks of frontier innovation rise, it becomes increasingly feasible to develop innovative 
capabilities  within the  MNC framework. This is the strategy pursued by countries like 
Singapore, Ireland and Hungary, with the dominant share of industrial R&D carried out by 
foreign affiliates.  
Using MNCs to develop local innovative capabilities is possible only if the host countries’ 
skill base is growing, local suppliers are improving their capabilities, technology institutions 
can provide more advanced services, and so on. This needs active government policies. 
Moreover, a policy to induce MNCs to enter more advanced activities by offering such 
inducements as specialised infrastructure and skills can accelerate the upgrading process. 
With a completely passive policy, MNC exports can remain at low, technologically stagnant, 
levels. Thus, an MNC dependent export strategy needs a proactive element for dynamic 
competitiveness.  
More important, depending on FDI is not a substitute for strengthening domestic capabilities. 
There are many activities that MNCs do not enter, including many locally oriented ones that 
tend to be populated by SMEs. They also need efficient local suppliers if they are to go 
beyond the assembly of imported components: capturing the spillover benefits of foreign 
presence needs capable local firms. More important, a strong base of national enterprises can 
lead to broader, deeper and more  flexible capabilities, since the technology development 
process within foreign affiliates may be curtailed as compared to local firms. The very fact 
that an affiliate can draw upon its parent company for technical information, skills, 
technological advances and so on means that it needs to invest less in its own capabilities. 
This applies particularly to functions like advanced engineering, design or R&D, which 
MNCs tend to centralise in industrial countries. As they mature industrially, it is imperative 
for developing countries to undertake these functions locally to support their future 
comparative advantage. This is why some countries choose to promote technology 
development in indigenous firms.  
8.2 SKILLS AND TECHNOLOGY EFFORT IN AFRICA  
Let us start by benchmarking skills. Africa lags other developing regions in formal education 
and vocational training. Its overall enrolment rates are very low, particularly in the higher 
level managerial and technical skills needed to handle modern technologies efficiently. One 
illustration of this is its enrolments in tertiary level technical subjects (Table 7).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 27  
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Enrolment data are not, as noted, the ideal measure of skills. They ignore on-the-job learning, 
other forms of training and quality differences in the education provided. Nevertheless, they 
are the only comparable data available and they do show the national base for skill 
acquisition. The Asian NIEs enrol over 33 times the percentage of their population in 
technical subjects than SSA (including South Africa). The leading 3 countries in terms of 
total numbers of technical enrolments  – China (18%), India (16%) and Korea (11%)  – 
account for 44 percent of the developing world’s technical enrolments, the top ten for 76 
percent and the top 20 for 93 percent.  
In terms of the  intensity of technical skill creation (enrolments as a percentage of the 
population), the picture is equally disturbing for Africa (Table 8). The world leader is Korea 
(1.65%), followed by Finland (1.33%). Taiwan, the next developing country, ranks fifth 
(1.07%). Most African countries come at the bottom of the table. The best is South Africa, at 
rank 52, followed by Zimbabwe at 60.  
Table 8: Technical tertiary enrolments by country (% population) 1995 
1  Korea  1.65  38  Bolivia  0.34 
2  Finland  1.33  39  Costa Rica  0.34 
3  Australia  1.17  40  Turkey  0.33 
4  Taiwan  1.06  41  Ecuador  0.29 
5  Spain  0.97  42  Uruguay  0.29 
6  Ireland  0.90  43  Venezuela  0.29 
7  Austria  0.78  44  El Salvador  0.26 
8  Germany  0.77  45  Morocco  0.25 
9  UK   0.75  46  Tunisia  0.24 
10  Chile  0.73  47  Indonesia  0.23 
11  Portugal  0.73  48  Nicaragua  0.22 
12  Sweden  0.73  49  Honduras  0.20 
13  Greece  0.72  50  Thailand  0.19 
14  Canada  0.69  51  Brazil  0.18 
Table 7: Tertiary level enrolments and enrolments in technical subjects (1995) 
  3 level enrolment  Technical enrolments: numbers &  % of population 
    Total No. 
students 
% pop.  Natural Science  Math's, computing  Engineering  All Technical 
subjects 
        Numbers  %  Numbers  %  Numbers  %  Numbers  % 
Developing countries  35,345,800  0.82%  2,046,566  0.05%  780,930  0.02%  4,194,433  0.10%  7,021,929  0.16% 
Sub-Saharan Africa  1,542,700  0.28%  111,500  0.02%  39,330  0.01%  69,830  0.01%  220,660  0.04% 
MENA  4,571,900  1.26%  209,065  0.06%  114,200  0.03%  489,302  0.14%  812,567  0.22% 
Latin America   7,677,800  1.64%  212,901  0.05%  188,800  0.04%  1,002,701  0.21%  1,404,402  0.30% 
Asia   21,553,400  0.72%  1,513,100  0.05%  438,600  0.01%  2,632,600  0.09%  4,584,300  0.15% 
  4 mature Tigers  3,031,400  4.00%  195,200  0.26%  34,200  0.05%  786,100  1.04%  1,015,500  1.34% 
  4 new Tigers   5,547,900  1.61%  83,600  0.02%  280,700  0.08%  591,000  0.17%  955,300  0.28% 
  S Asia   6,545,800  0.54%  996,200  0.08%  7,800  0.00%  272,600  0.02%  1,276,600  0.10% 
  China  5,826,600  0.60%  167,700  0.02%  99,400  0.01%  971,000  0.10%  1,238,100  0.13% 
  Others  601,700  0.46%  70,400  0.05%  16,500  0.01%  11,900  0.01%  98,800  0.08% 
Transition economies  2,025,800  1.95%  55,500  0.05%  30,600  0.03%  354,700  0.34%  440,800  0.42% 
Developed 
economies  
33,774,800  4.06%  1,509,334  0.18%  1,053,913  0.13%  3,191,172  0.38%  5,754,419  0.69% 
  Europe   12,297,400  3.17%  876,734  0.23%  448,113  0.12%  1,363,772  0.35%  2,688,619  0.69% 
  N America  16,430,800  5.54%  543,600  0.18%  577,900  0.19%  904,600  0.31%  2,026,100  0.68% 
  Japan   3,917,700  0.49%          805,800  0.10%  805,800  0.10% 
  Australia, N. 
Zealand 
1,128,900  5.27%  89,000  0.42%  27,900  0.13%  117,000  0.55%  233,900  1.09% 
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2 28 8   
15  Israel  0.68  52  S. Africa  0.17 
16  N. Zealand  0.68  53  Hungary  0.16 
17  USA  0.68  54  Malaysia  0.13 
18  Norway  0.67  55  Egypt  0.12 
19  Italy  0.64  56  India  0.12 
20  Japan  0.64  57  Jamaica  0.11 
21  France  0.61  58  Paraguay  0.11 
22  Denmark  0.60  59  China  0.10 
23  Panama  0.59  60  Zimbabwe  0.09 
24  Netherlands  0.56  61  Bangladesh  0.08 
25  Philippines  0.55  62  Nepal  0.08 
26  Colombia  0.51  63  Sri Lanka  0.08 
27  Switzerland  0.51  64  Cameroon  0.06 
28  H. Kong  0.49  65  Madagascar  0.06 
29  Romania  0.49  66  Pakistan  0.05 
30  Argentina  0.47  67  Senegal  0.05 
31  Singapore  0.47  68  Mauritius  0.04 
32  Peru  0.46  69  Congo  0.03 
33  Mexico  0.44  70  Kenya  0.02 
34  Belgium  0.43  71  CAR  0.01 
35  Jordan  0.42  72  Ethiopia  0.01 
36  Algeria  0.41  73  Malawi  0.01 
37  Poland  0.39       
Figure 18 shows tertiary enrolments as a percentage of the age group for the leading 20 
African countries. Note that the average for high income countries is 61% and for upper 
middle income countries 33%. Most Asian Tigers have high rates: Korea 82%, Thailand 37%, 
Philippines  30%, Malaysia 26% and China 13% (World Bank,  World Development 
Indicators, 2004). The highest in Africa is South Africa, with 15%, and this rate has declined 
over time.  
It is difficult to see how Africa can build competitive capabilities in modern industry with 
such low skill levels. It is not just for hi-tech that advanced skills are needed – even ‘simple’ 
activities like apparel, footwear and basic engineering products now need a modicum of such 
skills to compete in global markets.  If Africa is to grow by adding value to its natural 
resources, it will have to enter into much more complex, capital-intensive operations where 
technical skills are far more demanding.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 29  
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Coming now to technological effort, the only available comparative data across regions are 
for formal R&D and patents taken out (the former is an R&D input and the latter R&D 
output). These indicators are partial, since a large part – in developing countries the dominant 
part – takes the form of informal effort on the shop floor and supporting  quality, engineering, 
procurement and distribution operations. However, these indicators do provide insights into 
technological activity, bearing in mind that formal R&D becomes important in developing 
countries simply for absorbing complex new technologies. Table 9 shows regional R&D 
propensities.   
Table 9: R&D Propensities and manpower in major country groups (latest year available) 




Sector of performance 
(%) 
Source of Financing 
(% distribution) 
R&D by financing 
(% of GNP) 
  Per mill. 
Pop. 












Industrialised economies (b)  1,102  2,704,205  1.94  53.7  22.9  53.5  38.0  1.037  1.043 
Developing economies (c)  514  1,034,333  0.39  13.7  22.2  10.5  55.0  0.041  0.054 
Sub-Saharan Africa (exc. S 
Africa) 
83  3,193  0.28  0.0  38.7  0.6  60.9  0.002  0.000 
North Africa   423  29,675  0.40  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Latin America & Caribbean   339  107,508  0.45  18.2  23.4  9.0  78.0  0.041  0.082 
Asia (excluding Japan)  783  893,957  0.72  32.1  25.8  33.9  57.9  0.244  0.231 
   Mature NIEs (d)  2,121  189,212  1.50  50.1  36.6  51.2  45.8  0.768  0.751 
   New NIEs (e)  121  18,492  0.20  27.7  15.0  38.7  46.5  0.077  0.055 
   S Asia (f)  125  145,919  0.85  13.3  10.5  7.7  91.8  0.065  0.113 
   Middle East  296  50,528  0.47  9.7  45.9  11.0  51.0  0.051  0.045 
   China  350  422,700  0.50  31.9  13.7  N/A  N/A  N/A  0.160 
European transition economies 
(g) 
1,857  946,162  0.77  35.7  21.4  37.3  47.8  0.288  0.275 
World (79-84  countries)  1,304  4,684,700  0.92  36.6  24.7  34.5  53.2  0.318  0.337 
Source: Calculated from UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1997. Regional propensities for R&D spending are simple averages.  
Notes: (a) Only including countries with data, and with over 1 million inhabitants in 1995. 
(b) USA, Canada, West Europe, Japan, Australia and N Zealand. (c) Including Middle East oil states, Turkey, Israel, South Africa, and 
formerly socialist economies in Asia.  (d) Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province. (e) Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines. (f) 
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal (g) Including Russian Federation. 
Productive enterprise financed R&D as a share of GNP – in our view the best indicator of 
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Saharan Africa. Asia as a whole accounts for 86 percent of R&D scientists and engineers in 
the developing world, Sub-Saharan Africa for 0.3 percent, and Latin America for 10 percent. 
The proportion of enterprise financed R&D in total R&D spending is highest in the mature 
NIEs, followed by the new NIEs, and lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
Another way to benchmark technology is to combine R&D with patents taken out 
internationally (in this case, in the US). Table 10 shows an indicator created by the present 
author ranking countries by ‘technology intensity’ (Lall, 2003.a). It ranks a large sample of 
countries according to a combination of enterprise financed R&D and p atents (though 
countries at the bottom could not be ranked because they did not undertake meaningful 
technology effort by either measure).  
Table 10: Technology Effort Index (1997-98) 
  Productive enterprise financed 
R&D per capita (US$) 
Patents in US (per 1,000 
people) 
Technology Effort Index (a)  Technology 
Group 
1  Switzerland  859.9  USA  3.297  1  Japan  0.8649 
2  Japan  858.4  Japan  2.412  2  Switzerland  0.7858 
3  Sweden  653.9  Switzerland  1.884  3  USA  0.7709 
4  USA   465.9  Taiwan  1.622  4  Sweden  0.5957 
5  Germany  418.1  Sweden  1.421  5  Germany  0.4151 
6  Finland  413.4  Israel  1.275  6  Finland  0.4099 
7  Denmark  328.4  Germany  1.134  7  Denmark  0.3434 
8  France  297.6  Finland  1.118  8  Taiwan  0.3173 
9  Norway  275.5  Canada  1.090  9  Netherlands  0.2743 
10  Belgium  272.7  Denmark  1.005  10  France  0.2716 
11  Netherlands  258.8  Netherlands  0.817  11  Israel  0.2712 
12  Austria  214.4  Belgium  0.699  12  Belgium  0.2645 
13  S Korea  211.2  S Korea  0.657  13  Canada  0.2488 
14  Singapore  198.4  France  0.650  14  Norway  0.2344 
15  UK  174.5  UK  0.601  15  S Korea  0.2225 
16  Ireland  152.8  H Kong  0.540  16  Austria  0.2022 
17  Australia  148.0  Austria  0.511  17  UK  0.1926 
18  Canada  143.7  Norway  0.490  18  Singapore  0.1738 
19  Israel  134.0  Australia  0.402  19  Australia  0.1470 
20  Taiwan  122.5  Singapore  0.386  20  Ireland  0.1191 
21  Italy  90.1  N Zealand  0.356  21  Italy  0.0986 
22  Slovenia  73.3  Italy  0.305  22  N Zealand  0.0835 
23  Spain  55.2  Ireland  0.200  23  H Kong  0.0829 
HIGH 
24  N Zealand  50.7  Slovenia  0.076  24  Slovenia  0.0541 
25  Czech Rep  32.3  Spain  0.072  25  Spain  0.0431 
26  Portugal  14.1  Hungary  0.045  26  Czech Republic  0.0200 
27  Brazil  13.7  S Africa  0.030  27  Hungary  0.0135 
28  Greece  13.5  Malaysia  0.017  28  S Africa  0.0121 
29  S Africa  12.8  Greece  0.016  29  Greece  0.0103 
30  Hungary  11.3  Bahrain  0.016  30  Portugal  0.0096 
31  Argentina  8.5  Venezuela  0.013  31  Brazil  0.0087 
32  Poland  8.3  Russian Fed  0.012  32  Argentina  0.0067 
33  Russian Fed  7.5  Argentina  0.011  33  Malaysia  0.0065 
34  Malaysia  6.7  Chile  0.011  34  Russian Fed  0.0062 
35  C Rica  5.5  Uruguay  0.009  35  Poland  0.0055 
36  Chile  5.3  Portugal  0.009  36  Chile  0.0047 
37  Turkey  4.8  Mexico  0.009  37  C Rica  0.0041 
38  Romania  2.5  Czech Rep  0.008  38  Venezuela  0.0033 
39  Venezuela  2.3  Saudi Arabia  0.006  39  Turkey  0.0029 
40  H Kong  1.8  Ecuador  0.006  40  Bahrain  0.0024 
41  Mexico  1.5  C Rica  0.006  41  Mexico  0.0022 
42  Panama  1.4  Brazil  0.005  42  Uruguay  0.0020 








44  China  0.9  Poland  0.004  44  Saudi Arabia  0.0009 
45  Indonesia  0.8  Jamaica  0.004  45  Ecuador  0.0009 
46  India  0.4  Philippines  0.003  46  Panama  0.0008 
47  Mauritius  0.3  Thailand  0.002  47  Jordan  0.0008 
48  Thailand  0.3  Guatemala  0.002  48  China  0.0006 
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49  Egypt  0.2  Colombia  0.002  49  Jamaica  0.0006 
50  Colombia  0.2  Honduras  0.002  50  Philippines  0.0006 
51  Jordan  0.2  Bolivia  0.001  51  Indonesia  0.0005 
52  Guatemala  0.1  Tunisia  0.001  52  Thailand  0.0005 
53  Algeria  0.1  Sri Lanka  0.001  53  Colombia  0.0004 
54  Saudi Arabia  0.1  India  0.001  54  India  0.0004 
55  Peru  0.1  Morocco  0.001  55  Guatemala  0.0003 
56  Morocco  0.1  China  0.001  56  Honduras  0.0003 
57  Philippines  0.1  Turkey  0.000  57  Sri Lanka  0.0002 
58  Honduras  0.1  Indonesia  0.000  58  Bolivia  0.0002 
59  Nicaragua  0.1  Peru  0.000  59  Mauritius  0.0002 
60  Sri Lanka  0.1  Kenya  0.000  60  Morocco  0.0002 
-  Yemen  0  Egypt  0.000  61  Tunisia  0.0002 
-  Tunisia  0  Nigeria  0.000  62  Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
0.0001 
-  Malawi  0  Pakistan  0.000  63  Peru  0.0001 
-  Madagascar  0  Albania  0.000  64  Algeria  0.0001 
-  Kenya  0  Algeria  0.000  65  Nicaragua  0.0001 
-  Jamaica  0  Bangladesh  0.000  66  Kenya  0.0001 
 
-  Ecuador  0  Cameroon  0.000  -  Nigeria  0.0000 
-  Albania  0  CAR  0.000  -  Pakistan  0.0000 
-  Bahrain  0  El Salvador  0.000  -  Albania  0.0000 
-  Bangladesh  0  Ethiopia  0.000  -  Bangladesh  0.0000 
-  Bolivia  0  Ghana  0.000  -  Cameroon  0.0000 
-  Cameroon  0  Madagascar  0.000  -  CAR  0.0000 
-  CAR  0  Malawi  0.000  -  El Salvador  0.0000 
-  El Salvador  0  Mauritius  0.000  -  Ethiopia  0.0000 
-  Ethiopia  0  Mozambique  0.000  -  Ghana  0.0000 
-  Ghana  0  Nepal  0.000  -  Madagascar  0.0000 
-  Mozambique  0  Nicaragua  0.000  -  Malawi  0.0000 
-  Nepal  0  Oman  0.000  -  Mozambique  0.0000 
-  Nigeria  0  Panama  0.000  -  Nepal  0.0000 
-  Oman  0  Paraguay  0.000  -  Oman  0.0000 
-  Pakistan  0  Romania  0.000  -  Paraguay  0.0000 
-  Paraguay  0  Senegal  0.000  -  Senegal  0.0000 
-  Senegal  0  Tanzania  0.000  -  Tanzania  0.0000 
-  Tanzania  0  Uganda  0.000  -  Uganda  0.0000 
-  Uganda  0  Yemen  0.000  -  Yemen  0.0000 
-  Zambia  0  Zambia  0.000  -  Zambia  0.0000 
NEGLIGIBLE 
-  Zimbabwe  0  Zimbabwe  0.000  -  Zimbabwe  0.0000   
Source: Lall (2003.a) 
All African countries in the table, with the exception of South Africa (rank 28 in the index) 
are at the bottom of the table, along with other less-industrialized countries. A final indicator 
technological capacity is the World Bank’s new ‘knowledge economy index’ (available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2004), based on its Knowledge Assessment 
Methodology (KAM). KAM consists of 76 structural and qualitative variables that serve as 
proxies for the ‘four pillars’ of  the development of a knowledge economy. The variables 
comprise measures of growth, governance, skills, technological effort and ICT infrastructure 
(described in  http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2004/html/generic_technical.htm).  The 
Knowledge Index is the average of the performance of a country in three ‘pillars’: Education, 
Innovation and Information Communications & Technology (it ignores the governance 
indicators). It thus serves as a useful combination of the factors reviewed earlier, with the 
addition of an ICT infrastructure variable. 
Figures 19 and 20 show the Knowledge Index scores for Africa and East Asia in 1995 and the 
most recent available year, the scores ranging between 1 and 10. The four mature Asian 
Tigers are well in advance of other Asian countries, but even the least developed, Indonesia, 
ranks about the same as Botswana, which comes third in Africa after South Africa and 
Mauritius, the two outliers in the region. The rest of Africa scores very low in the index, even 
compared to other developing regions, not shown here.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 32  
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These scores reiterate our findings that Africa is very poorly placed in terms of the basic 
structural requirements of building a modern knowledge-based economy. Thus, getting a 
healthy investment climate in place  may be a desirable first step, but is unlikely to be 
sufficient to catalyse African industrial competitiveness.  
 
8.3 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT  
Foreign investors have recently taken an increasing interest in Africa since 2000. As Table 11 
shows, the share of SSA in global FDI inflows has risen from 0.42% in 2000 to 1.65% in 
2003 (data from UNCTAD, 2004). According to the UNCTAD Inward FDI Performance 
Index, which calculates the host region’s share in global FDI as a ratio of its share in global 
GDP, Africa has raised its value from 0.89 in 2000-2002 to 1.28 in 2001-2003 (UNCTAD, 
2004, p.12). Three countries dominate FDI in Africa because of their  size and resources 
(South Africa, Nigeria and Angola), but their share in inflows to the region has declined from 
58% in 1999 to 37% in 2003. Thus,  FDI  trends in other African countries  are also 
encouraging.  
Table 11: FDI inflows by region (current $ million and percentages) 
Region 
1992-7 
average  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Values of FDI inflows 
SSA   4,010  8,558  5,810  14,126  8,149  9,250 
South Africa   1,045  1,502  888  6,789  757  762 
SSA 2 (ex. South Africa)  2,965  7,056  4,922  7,337  7,392  8,488 
Nigeria   1,402  1,005  930  1,104  1,281  1,200 
Angola   304  2,471  879  2,146  1,643  1,415 
SSA2 excl. Nigeria/Angola  1,259  3,580  3,113  4,087  4,468  5,873 
East Asia   67,120  106,020  139,591  98,246  81,791  90,849 
South Asia   2,489  3,095  3,092  3,982  4,535  6,066 
MENA   4,855  3,993  4,412  11,589  7,185  9,916 
LAC   38,167  107,406  97,537  88,139  51,358  49,722 
World   310,879  1,086,750  1,387,953  817,574  678,751  559,576 
Figure 20: Knowledge Index - East Asia











Figure 19: Knowledge Index - Africa
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Developing world   118,596  231,880  252,459  219,721  157,612  172,033 
FDI in SSA as % of global FDI 
SSA   1.29%  0.79%  0.42%  1.73%  1.20%  1.65% 
SSA2 (ex. South Africa)   0.95%  0.65%  0.35%  0.90%  1.09%  1.52% 
SSA2 ex. Nigeria & Angola   0.40%  0.33%  0.22%  0.50%  0.66%  1.05% 
FDI in SSA as % of developing world FDI 
SSA   3.38%  3.69%  2.30%  6.43%  5.17%  5.38% 
SSA2   2.50%  3.04%  1.95%  3.34%  4.69%  4.93% 
SSA2 ex. Nigeria & Angola   1.06%  1.54%  1.23%  1.86%  2.83%  3.41% 
FDI in other regions as % of global FDI 
East Asia   21.59%  9.76%  10.06%  12.02%  12.05%  16.24% 
South Asia   0.80%  0.28%  0.22%  0.49%  0.67%  1.08% 
MENA   1.56%  0.37%  0.32%  1.42%  1.06%  1.77% 
LAC   12.28%  9.88%  7.03%  10.78%  7.57%  8.89% 
Developing world % total   38.15%  21.34%  18.19%  26.87%  23.22%  30.74% 
Source: UNCTAD (2004), Annex table B.1                
FDI in East Asia has recovered from the financial crisis in 1997, and the rise of China as a 
host country has helped raise its global share sharply in 2003. There are, in fact, fears within 
East Asia that China will ‘suck away’ FDI from other recipients,  though  there is little 
evidence  for this.
11 LAC continues to suffer a continuing decline in inflows since 1999, 
largely because of anaemic growth and the maturing of privatization. South Asia shows a 
steady if modest increase, largely due to liberalization and strong growth in India.  
Table 12 shows inward FDI per capita in Africa 
and East Asia in 1995 and 2000. While Singapore 
and Hong Kong dominate in both years, Mauritius 
appears in third place, Angola in sixth place and 
Lesotho in seventh in 2000.
12 Botswana received 
more FDI per capita than China, while South 
Africa was ahead of the Philippines. The bottom 
of the list had Indonesia, which was still suffering 
the aftermath of the financial crisis and knock-on 
political effects.  
One  important reason for the rise in  investment 
interest in Africa is improved policies:  trade and 
FDI  liberalization, better macro policies and 
greater socio-political stability.  Assuming  that 
these improvements continue, the rise in interest is 
likely to be sustained.  Two  other  significant 
reasons  for increased FDI in Africa  are the 
growing pressures for primary resources and the 
privatization of utilities in several countries: the 
                                                 
11 A statistical analysis of FDI inflows in East Asia using China as an independent variable along with other 
determinants of FDI (including the financial crisis) does not find that China reduces inflows to other countries. 
In fact, in some periods it raises FDI in other countries. See Lall and Zhou (forthcoming). 
12 However, the Lesotho figure is misleading in that it includes inflows of South African government 
investment in the Highlands W ater Project and is not FDI in the normal sense of the term. See Lall 
(forthcoming).  
Table 12: Net FDI inflows per capita (current $) 
1995  2000 
Singapore  2,492.3   Hong Kong  9,290.9  
Hong Kong  2,256.3   Singapore  1,345.6  
Malaysia  202.7   Mauritius  223.8  
Lesotho  147.3   Korea  197.5  
Botswana  47.1   Malaysia  162.8  
Angola  41.7   Angola  66.9  
Korea  39.4   Lesotho  57.9  
Thailand  35.3   Thailand  55.4  
South Africa  31.9   Botswana  34.1  
China  29.8   China  30.4  
Indonesia  22.5   South Africa  22.6  
Philippines  21.6   Philippines  16.2  
Mauritius  16.7   Cote d'Ivoire  14.7  
Cote d'Ivoire  15.2   Sudan  12.6  
Zambia  10.8   Zambia  12.1  
Zimbabwe  10.3   Benin  10.3  
Nigeria  9.7   Togo  9.3  
Togo  6.7   Senegal  9.2  
Uganda  6.3   Indonesia  -22.1  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 34  
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former is likely to continue while the latter will taper off over time (UNCTAD, 2004, p. 45). 
Finally, there is some stimulus to foreign investors from AGOA (the African Growth and 
Opportunities Act of the US), which came into force in 2000 and offers quota and tariff-free 
access to the US market for a large range of manufactured and primary products from many 
African countries. The EBA (Everything but Arms) initiative of the EU, which gives similar 
privileges for the European market, reinforces the privileged market access that Africa enjoys 
in the world’s largest markets. 
In theory, these privileges should stimulate FDI in export-oriented manufacturing in Africa. 
Wages in Africa are now among the lowest in the developing world and FDI policies (at least 
on paper) are similar to those in other regions. There are, in addition, a large number of 
export processing zones, many of which are managed by private companies. While there 
remain infrastructure deficiencies in several countries and the landlocked ones face higher 
transport costs, there are many coastal countries that should be able to capitalize on these 
advantages.  And some landlocked countries have reasonable access to ports through 
neighbouring countries, particularly those next to South Africa. 
There are, however, few signs that Africa is using these advantages and investor interest to 
mount a sustained rise in manufactured exports. South Africa apart, there is still very little 
FDI in export-oriented manufacturing in Africa, and even in South Africa the range of 
interest is narrow, largely limited to automobiles and processed foods, with almost no FDI in 
labour-intensive activities that could help relieve its unemployment problem. In the rest of 
Africa, despite its relatively low wages, there is no surge of FDI in labour-intensive export-
oriented activities of the type that drove East Asian growth. The region remains effectively 
marginal to the operations of global value chains in labour-intensive manufactures, 
particularly in the hi-tech activities that are the main cause of East Asian success.  
AGOA has raised hopes in Africa of an export boom – in the US the intention was that it 
would draw American investors and use American materials, rather like the Mexican 
maquiladoras. Both hopes have not really been fulfilled. The bulk of increased exports under 
AGOA have been resource-based products, led by petroleum. In manufacturing, there has 
been some growth of apparel exports, but due mainly to quotas on apparel exports by (the 
more efficient) producers in East Asia.
13 There is no growth of other labour-intensive exports 
(like footwear, toys or sports goods) on which there are no quota restrictions. The largest and 
most dynamic exporter of apparel under AGOA has been Lesotho, and its experience offers 
very useful lessons for African industrialization and competitiveness (Box 5). And there has 
been little response from US companies in terms of investing in Africa in manufacturing or 
providing it with inputs (they are simply too expensive in the relevant activities, mainly 
textiles). Similarly, there is a low probability that the EU EBA initiative will stimulate 
manufactured exports by Africa, any more that the Lomé Convention did earlier. 
Box 5: Lessons on export-oriented FDI in Africa from Lesotho  
Lesotho, a small, resource poor and land-locked country inside South Africa, is behaving rather like an East Asian ‘Tiger’. It 
is currently the largest and fastest growing exporter of clothing from Sub-Saharan Africa to the US. Some 70 percent of its 
exports are manufactures (compared to 25 percent for Africa as a whole), and they have grown at 30 percent per annum 
                                                 
13 The value of African textile and apparel exports remains minuscule by world standards: Africa’s world 
market share in this sector was only 0.78 percent in 2000, and had declined from 0.86 percent in 1990. 
Mauritius accounted for a large part of apparel exports, but it is something of an outlier in the African scene; 
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during 1999-2002.  Lesotho has relied on investors from East Asia to drive its industrial and export growth. The 38 clothing 
factories in the country now employ around 40 thousand people and exported $318 million worth of apparel to the US in 
2002. These exports took place under AGOA (the African Growth and Opportunities Act), which gives African countries 
tariff and quota free access to the US market. In 2002, Lesotho’s apparel exports were 2.6 larger than Kenya’s, the next 
largest beneficiary from AGOA; they were also much larger than AGOA exports by better-established clothing exporters in 
Africa like Mauritius ($107 m.) and South Africa ($88 m.).  
Foreign owned apparel exporters are not new to Lesotho. The first Asian plants moved there from South Africa in the late 
1980s when sanctions were imposed on the apartheid regime. They took advantage of the Lomé Convention (giving quota 
and duty free access to the EU) to export to Europe. However, the Convention stipulated that after some time two stages of 
apparel processing (yarn and textile manufacture) had to be undertaken locally: this was economically unfeasible. Lesotho 
managed to get this requirement postponed for 8 years; after that – in the late 1990s – exports to Europe fell sharply. The 
launch of AGOA gave the industry a new lease of life. The long experience of Asian investors in the country, with the 
associated development of production capabilities, let them take a lead over other countries with AGOA privileges, 
including those with larger, longer-established industrial sectors and better location. The first lesson of Lesotho is then that 
the cumulative accumulation of capabilities, even of the simplest kind in clothing assembly, is vital to competitiveness. 
AGOA has two stages. At the end of the first stage, due in 2008, one further stage of apparel manufacturing (i.e. fabric) has 
to be undertaken within Africa or the fabric has to be imported from the USA, a high cost source (East Asia is the cheapest). 
At the end of the second stage, in 2015, all AGOA privileges will end. An equally important, and more immediate, change is 
to be the abolition of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) by end 2004. MFA drove Asian apparel exporters to Africa (and 
to several other countries, from Bangladesh and Sri Lanka to Latin America and the Caribbean) in the first instance, 
crippling growth by the most efficient producers (in East Asia) and forcing exporters to use low-wage but less efficient sites 
elsewhere. The MFA also explains why AGOA has not attracted any other labour-intensive assembly to Africa, even though 
trade concessions also apply to them. No footwear, toy, sports goods or similar assembly activities are relocating to Africa 
despite the tariff advantages they enjoy over competing producers. This suggests that tariff advantages do not offset Africa’s 
productivity disadvantage. The second lesson of Lesotho then is that there is a huge productivity lag in the region.  
This does not mean that Lesotho’s exporters will leave when MFA expires. As noted, enterprises have built basic production 
capabilities and these may suffice with tariff advantages (currently about 17% over East Asian competitors) without quota 
protection However, the end of the first stage of AGOA in 2008 will mean that African exporters can no longer import 
fabrics from Asia. Procuring fabrics in Africa or the US will impose a cost handicap unless local production can be brought 
up to productivity levels of East Asia (wages are not too different from China). Fabric production is more capital and skill 
intensive than apparel assembly, and the extent of the cost handicap will depend on how much productivity differs from East 
Asia.  
Apparel assembly in Lesotho, simple as it is, still suffers from low productivity. Scattered evidence suggests that the 
productivity of Lesotho workers is between 30 to 70 percent lower than in China. As wages are not very different from 
China, such a large productivity gap will be unsustainable once AGOA ends: the activity cannot compete in open markets, 
even if it reverts to importing cheap fabrics from Asia. The lack of local linkages exacerbates the cost disadvantages 
imposed by low productivity. Even after 15 years of operations, the industry has not catalysed the growth of local 
subcontractors or suppliers. This is very different from countries like Bangladesh where within a few years of East Asian 
investment hundreds of local garment exporters had started up – and Bangladesh had a relatively weak entrepreneurial 
tradition in South Asia.  
The reasons for lower productivity within apparel manufacturing appear to lie in the wage system (time rather than piece 
wages), low levels of formal skills, the lack of training (apart from basic on-the-job training) and poor employer-worker 
relationships. Asian firms do not invest much in employee training, preferring to use Chinese supervisors and technicians. 
The government has done nothing to encourage skill formation by firms (say, by fiscal incentives), nor has it set up any 
training facilities for the industry. Its main efforts have been directed to getting AGOA extended rather than to using the 
remaining ‘grace period’ to raise capabilities to competitive levels. There is thus a real risk that the industry will evaporate 
once AGOA ends, unless the government launches targeted capability building measures and provides the basic public goods 
that the industry needs. 
Lesotho has a good investment climate, with well-managed macro policy (run by South Africa), liberal trade regime, 
welcoming FDI policies, low business costs, reasonable infrastructure and low taxes (15%). This is not, however, the reason 
for its industrial and export success: the real reason (apart from sanctions on South Africa) lies in the trade ‘distortions’ (the 
MFA, the Lomé Convention and AGOA) that gave it a form of infant industry protection. While such protection has 
stimulated growth, it will yield lasting benefit only if the infant ‘grows up’ and is able to compete on open markets. This 
involves productivity raising measures that again have little to do with having a good investment climate.  
Source: Lall (forthcoming)  
The basic problem of African industrial competitiveness lies not in market access to rich 
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back a significant and sustained supply response. As the Lesotho case shows, its  good 
‘framework conditions’ account less for its surge in apparel exports than its past experience 
of apparel manufacture and its ties to East Asian full package suppliers. Its low wages will 
not be enough to offset low productivity and the lack of local linkages once trade privileges 
and constraints on Asian competitors are removed.  
To the extent that this applies  to other African industrializing countries apart from South 
Africa, there are important policy lessons for building African competitiveness. Put simply, 
Africa cannot compete and benefit from globalization at current levels of productivity, which 
is too low for its wages to offset in activities that face direct foreign competition. Productivity 
remains low even in entry-level manufacturing activities with relatively undemanding skill 
and organisational requirements, and after years of production experience. If Africa cannot 
compete here the prospects for the development of more complex activities are rather bleak.  
Progress in resource-based manufacturing may be an  industrialization option for countries 
that have resources, but having raw materials does not guarantee a competitive edge in 
processing it. The leading resource-based exporters in the developing world are countries like 
Singapore and the Republic of Korea that do not have their own resources but are able to 
efficiently process imported primary materials. In the industrial world, countries with large 
resource bases (Canada, Australia or Finland) do export processed resources, but their 
success rests on having strong technological capabilities in these activities. Many processing 
activities need advanced capital- and skill-intensive technologies to meet the rigorous 
standards of export markets; food products are particularly demanding because of sanitary 
requirements. Africa cannot industrialise using its ample resources unless it develops the 
capabilities to handle such complex technologies efficiently.   
Africa thus needs to do  much  more than open up and improve the investment climate. 
Liberalization  can spur efficiency, but where capabilities are too weak to cope with 
international competition, it can simply lead to the destruction of capacity and the dispersal of 
existing capabilities. In these conditions, local firms will not set up new facilities in areas 
where they face full international competition; nor will foreign investors enter. This  is 
precisely the experience of much of Africa. A vigorous supply response is possible only if 
governments help new  industrial  capabilities to develop.  Without this,  the investment 
response of the private sector (local and foreign) is bound to be hesitant and inadequate.  
9. CONCLUSIONS  
There have been many grand initiatives on African development. Most have failed 
conspicuously. The reasons are complex, including bad luck (shocks like droughts, famines, 
political and social instability, or declining prices for primary exports), poor governance, 
wrong strategy design and weak implementation. The ‘luck factor’ is more propitious now: 
many African countries are over the worst of internal and external conflicts, macroeconomic 
management is improving and there are signs of better governance. It is the design and 
implementation of development initiatives that remains most problematic. Past initiatives 
have not integrated properly social and economic objectives. This should be corrected, 
integrating social, health, education and distribution issues into a seamless whole.  
Africa must industrialize if it is to develop. A healthy and competitive manufacturing sector 
is necessary to drive income, export and employment growth. It is also necessary to move 
African economies out of their reliance on primary activities that promise little in terms of 
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upgrading, the seedbed of entrepreneurship and modern services, and the most productive 
way in which Africa can integrate into the international economy. Catalyzing industrial 
growth in Africa needs a new strategy.  
The dominant mainstream solution to growth problems – a universal prescription to create a 
healthy investment climate and leave the rest to the market – is inadequate and misplaced. It 
neglects the capacity of African industry to respond to the challenges of  competition, 
technical change, growing skill needs and shrinking economic distance. There is, 
unfortunately, no ‘quick fix’ to develop industry – the process is slow and cumulative, and 
differs by industry and country. At its heart lie industrial capabilities, the development of 
which call for more than better macro management, improved governance and a healthy 
investment climate. The first  step in revitalizing African industry is to include detailed 
supply-side measures.  
To create and develop industrial and technological capabilities African countries need to 
reconsider the strategies they are pursuing today. In particular, they must reconsider the role 
of government policy in supporting capability building, drawing upon the experience of East 
Asia (see Lall, 1996, 2001 and UNIDO, 2004). However, their freedom to mount the policies 
needed is often limited by the international system (multilateral development institutions, 
global financial institutions, trading partners, aid donors, investors and so on). No industrial 
strategy can hope to succeed unless it receives this community’s approval and support. There 
are available policy spaces that Africa must fully exploit; however, there is also a strong case 
for relaxing some of the constraints on policy that the East Asian countries (and indeed the 
presently developed economies) did not face when building industrial capabilities.  
Certainly, Africa will need investment – for additions to physical capacity in the form of 
factories, equipment and so on  – but just building capacity is not the answer to African 
industrial problems. More important is to build capabilities to operate plants at competitive 
levels, raise quality, introduce new products and diversify into higher value-added activities 
and to attract FDI into such activities. This needs a more precious resource than money – 
skills, organisation, knowledge, effort and institutions. If the international community focuses 
on these it would make a more significant contribution to African development than it has in 
the recent past. Throwing money at the problem will not resolve the fundamental issues of 
competitiveness – it may make it worse.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS122  Page 38  
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